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Legal procedures in Greece – our best evidence comes from Athens of the
fifth and fourth centuries BCE – and Rome have only some common features.
The major commonality was that in Greece and in archaic and classical
Roman law (up to the second century CE) lawsuits had to pass through two
stages, one of preparation and one of decision. The first took place before a
magistrate, in Athens one of the nine archons, in Rome the Praetor
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah20109/full),
all of them belonging to the board of supreme officials of the respective
27.12.12 21:05Procedure, legal, Greek and Roman - The Encyclopedia of Ancient History - Thür - Wiley Online Library
Seite 2 von 8file:///Users/thuer/Desktop/full.html
cities. In the second stage, chosen laymen rendered the decision. The
reason for this division might have been, conjecturally, that judicial litigation
in both societies originated in oaths to be sworn by the parties. The main
difference was that Greeks never had confidence in the decision-making of a
single layman, while in Rome a sole iudex privatus (private judge, see Iudex
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13124/full))
became usual in most private cases. Not until the postclassical period did
Romans drop the strict division into two stages and magistrates or governors
of the provinces generally decide cases on their own authority.
 
1. Top of page
2. Greece
3. Rome
Main sources are the speeches of the ten Attic orators (Demosthenes etc.)
and the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (see Aristotle, Constitution of the
Athenians
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah04046/full));
the best general reference is Harrison (1971), see also Todd (1993) and
MacDowell (1978). From outside Athens hundreds of stone inscriptions
reflecting legal procedure are preserved, but no comprehensive book exists;
for the region of Arcadia, see Thür and Taeuber (1994).
In Athens there were two types of actions, private and public. The first type,
the Dike
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13081/full)
(literally action, lawsuit; verdict, punishment), could be initiated only by a
person who had suffered some wrong at the hands of the defendant, ranging
from financial damage to the killing of a relative. A Graphe
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13108/full)
Greece
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(literally writing) and some similar actions (see Eisangelia
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13094/full);
Phasis
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13200/full))
were public in the sense that any person qualified to plead could sue a
wrongdoer as a volunteer prosecutor (see Boulomenos, ho
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13031/full)).
Only a male adult citizen had the legal capacity to file a lawsuit; women and
minors were represented by their tutors (kurioi, sg. kurios). Private cases of
resident aliens (metics) fell in the province of the polemarchos, one of the
nine archons, while foreigners could seek the protection of the courts only
when international treaties existed.
Private and public trials generally followed the same scheme. After a private
summons before two witnesses the plaintiff or prosecutor stated his claim or
accusation to the magistrate and the defendant gave his response, both in
writing. The magistrate fixed a date for the first stage of litigation, the pretrial
session (see Anakrisis
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13016/full)),
in some private cases performed as a diaita by a public arbitrator chosen by
lot (diaitetes, see Diaitetai
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13076/full))
instead of the magistrate. In both types of pretrial sessions parties could
prepare their arguments for the next stage, the main hearing. In these
sessions they could question each other – therefore one can call the pretrial
stage the “dialectic” one – and, as a matter of fairness, they had to disclose
all the documentary evidence to be used before the court. The documents
were kept safe for the hearing in sealed ceramic pots (echinoi; Thür 2008).
Pretrial sessions could be extended over several days and often led to a
compromise, to avoid appearing before the court. If a defendant protested
the referral of the case to court, e.g., because of limitation of time, he could
enter a Paragraphe
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah04232/full)
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(lit. writing beside, i.e., beside the plaintiff's petition). Then the magistrate
would be forced to bring this preliminary question to trial independent of the
main issue.
In homicide cases three pretrial sessions (prodikasiai), presided over by the
archon basileus, were necessary; in them, both parties swore solemn oaths
proclaiming guilt or innocence, respectively. These oaths were sworn anew
before the judges each time and the court had to decide by voting which of
the two oaths was the better one (Antiph. or. 1.15). From Draco
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13089/full)
law on homicide, 621/20 BCE (a copy is preserved as IG I3 104, 409/8), one
can conjecture that the magistrates formulated the wording of these oaths
and imposed them on the parties. Combining this text with other archaic
sources one can further conjecture that, before Draco, archaic Greek
authorities settled litigation by imposing an oath – of decisive character – on
only one party. Therefore dividing legal procedure into a preparatory and a
decisive stage might have had its origin in (1) a preliminary session that
resulted in a decree imposing an oath on one litigant, and in swearing that
decisive oath (Hom. Il. 18.497–508); (2) a preliminary session imposing
oaths on both parties, and a subsequent court session in which judges
decided by vote which of the two oaths was the better one (Draco; Thür 1996
; opposed by Gagarin 2009).
The opinions on the next stage, the decisive main hearing, are less
controversial. In classical Athens this stage is well documented. A law court
(Dikasterion
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13079/full))
was organized as a democratic institution to create, above all, equal
opportunities for both litigants on their court day. Early in the morning
laymen, male citizens over thirty years old, were chosen by lot to fill the court
panels as judges (in modern parlance, “jurors”). On that day they had to
conclude all the trials scheduled. Depending on the issues, the size of the
panels varied from 201 to 2,501. Only in murder cases heard by the council
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of the Areopagus were the judges known to the parties in advance.
Trials were organized in a very simple way. The parties each gave their
pleas for exactly the same length of time measured out by a waterclock
(klepsydra). When the clerk read aloud the documents filed during the
preparatory sessions, the water was stopped. Witness testimony was also
prepared as a document; the witness had only to confirm it by his presence.
Neither questions by the judges or the presiding magistrate, nor cross-
examination by the litigants, were possible (see Proof, legal, Greek and
Roman
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13208/full)).
Litigants had to plead in person, although supporters (sunegoroi) were
allowed. All depended on effective speeches, often drafted by professional
speechwriters (logographoi) acting as “ghostwriters” only. Therefore one can
call the trial in court the “rhetorical” stage of litigation.
Immediately after the speeches the judges cast their secret-ballot votes
without deliberating or giving reasons. The pebbles (or, later, bronze ballots)
were counted and a herald announced the total: the claim had been
approved or rejected. No judgment was formulated. Only after the trial could
a party sue the opposing witnesses for damages because of false testimony.
Summing up, in Athens litigation was a match (agon) between the litigants
fought with exactly timed speeches, where the parties' characters and social
reputation were also at stake (Lanni 2006).
 
1. Top of page
2. Greece
3. Rome
Main sources are the casuistic works of the classical Roman jurists from the
first three centuries CE, compiled in Justinian's Digesta
Rome
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first three centuries CE, compiled in Justinian's Digesta
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13078/full)
(533 CE); most useful is the systematic approach by Gaius in the fourth book
of his Institutes (translation and commentary by De Zulueta 1953 and
Manthe 2004). An indispensable reference is Kaser and Hackl (1996); see
also Nicholas (1962).
Roman jurists and modern scholars describe and analyze, above all, private
litigation (for criminal procedure, see Robinson 2007). Three systems of
procedure were successively normal in suits at Rome between citizens: (1)
the legis actiones, going back to and beyond the Twelve Tables
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13255/full);
(2) the formulary system, introduced by the lex Aebutia (ca. 150 CE) and
generalized by Augustus; and (3) the Cognitio
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13048/full)
extra ordinem, which gradually encroached on the formulary system during
the Early Empire and by the time of Diocletian and Constantine had
superseded it.
The two older procedures had in common a division into two stages, similar
to the Greek pattern. The first stage took place at the magistrate's tribunal (in
iure). Its object was to define the issue and to empower an unofficial
authority, normally the iudex unus (or privatus), to hear and to decide it. The
second stage (apud iudicem) was the trial by this appointed authority. The
praetor urbanus accepted lawsuits between citizens, but could not decide the
cases himself; the praetor peregrinus, competent for foreigners, and
provincial governors were subject to no such restriction, but usually made
use of the formulary system nonetheless.
There is only little evidence, and much conjecture, about the legis actiones.
The general form was the sacramentum, commonly understood to have
been at first an oath sworn by both parties, later a sum of money backing
both parties' claims. For this type of procedure panels of judges are also
mentioned. Parallels to the Greek pattern seem probable despite the fact
that the Romans used much more fixed verbal forms.
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that the Romans used much more fixed verbal forms.
The formulary system is much better known. Here the praetor was free to
state the legal issue in a Formula
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13103/full),
as a programmatic statement of the issue which the iudex was to judge. A
treasury of legal experience was laid down in the Edict of the praetor in the
form of entries enumerating the legal means for litigation. At the stage in iure
the litigants and the praetor adapted these means for the case; subsequently
the parties accepted the formula by Litis contestatio
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13173/full).
Proceedings before the iudex were oral and informal; the formula laid down
the precise question that he was to decide. He was free to form his opinion
by such methods as he thought best. Judgment (sententia) had to condemn
or absolve the defendant, and condemnatio was always in a sum of money.
In the system of cognitio extraordinaria the magistrate heard the whole case
and decided it. It was the origin of the modern procedure in which only the
state administers justice.
 
SEE ALSO: Archon/archontes
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah04039/full);
Edict, praetor's
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13093/full);
Legis actio
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13161/full).
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In ancient Greece and Rome the law of evidence was very similar. One can compare the system of 
proof administered in Athens in the age of the ten great orators, from the end of the fifth to the end of 
the fourth century BCE, with that used in the period of the classical Roman jurists, the first three 
centuries CE, when the “formulary system” of litigation generally prevailed (for terms used in this
article and the general background see Procedure, legal, Greek and Roman
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13207/full)). Only for these 
periods are sufficient sources preserved, although no modern comparative legal study exists. 
Common features were: that all means of proof had to be disclosed to the opposite party during 
preparatory sessions before magistrates; in the main hearing, the lay judges were free to form their 
opinions of the evidence as they thought best. Only in the postclassical Roman Cognitio
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13048/full) extra ordinem were 
formal rules on evidence introduced.
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The best general reference is Harrison (1971: 133–54) with some corrections by Thür (2005 and 
2008). Aristotle (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah04046/full)
account of the five means of proof, “laws, witnesses, contracts, statements under Torture
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah22267/full), oath” (Arist. Rh.
1375a 24), is misleading. He only gives examples of what he calls, in a rhetorical sense, “non-artistic
proofs.” Laws (nomoi), however, have nothing to do with evidence in a legal sense. His account
therefore refers to documents the clerk read aloud to the court with the waterclock stopped, not proof
in general. Coming from outside the speech these documents did not belong to the “art” of rhetoric.
The only relevant judicial proof listed by Aristotle was witness testimony. Only free males were
allowed to witness. Each litigant formulated beforehand the depositions he planned to use in court.
Normally the wording was a sentence: “N. N. knows ” or “N. N. was present when .” In the
preliminary hearing the prospective witnesses could agree to testify in court or swear an oath of
disclaimer, that he “doesn't know ” (exomosia). In both cases the witnesses had to appear at the 
main hearing either to confirm the depositions or to stick to their oaths. Only a witness who had 
positively affirmed the deposition was liable to a suit of false testimony (dike pseudomarturion; see
Dike, dike (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13081/full)) after the 
main trial. In the fifth century BCE depositions were oral, while in the fourth century written 
documents were filed during the preparatory sessions (Anakrisis
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13016/full) or diaita; see Diaitetai
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13076/full)), but the wording was 
always the same. In no case could the witness describe relevant facts to the court in his own words. 
He was also never required to answer questions from members of the court, the presiding magistrate, 
or the litigants. Testimony from hearsay while the informer was still alive was strongly discouraged 
(Dem. or. 46.7) by the sanction of a future suit of false testimony. In trial, the risk of this suit and the
witness's character – often argued in court speeches – were the only bases on which to evaluate a
deposition. Outside Athens, in an international case, after the first speeches in court both litigants
were allowed to question the witnesses (IK 41 Knidos 1.221.67–72 = Syll.3 953.44–9; ca. 300 BCE). 
In Athens a suit of false testimony had no influence on the original verdict, but the offended party 
Athens 
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could receive payment of a fine that doubled the amount of the damage resulting from the testimony. 
A witness who had been convicted of false testimony three times lost his civil rights.
Other means of proof were employed outside court. The Athenian panels of hundreds of judges were 
unable to examine the authenticity of a document, especially in the restricted time limit of the trial. 
Thus a litigant brought witnesses to confirm it. Alternatively he could challenge his opponent 
beforehand to concede authenticity. This challenge (proklesis) was issued before witnesses, who 
could then testify also to the opponent's reaction. A challenge was also necessary to question slaves 
under torture (basanos); otherwise slave testimony was not relevant. Basanos was a private 
procedure administered only when the litigant to whom the slave belonged handed him or her over to 
the opponent, who would then administer the lashes. The opponent was not allowed to examine the 
slave, but was instead bound strictly by the issue formulated in and accepted with the proklesis.
Under torture, the slave could only affirm or refute a question worded like a witness deposition: that
the slave “knew” about the issue. Even though many challenges were mentioned, in the court
speeches not a single slave deposition given under torture is preserved. In court, the speakers
regularly brought in witnesses about the fact that the opponents had refused the challenge, to make the
point that the opponents had agreed with the issue. Also, oaths sworn out of court to affirm certain
facts – the only means for women to testify – or to settle the whole case were only relevant after an
agreement resulting from a challenge.
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The classical Roman jurists did not care much about the law of evidence. Proof, as a matter of 
verifying facts, belonged to the free discretion of the courts, the Iudex
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13124/full) unus and the board of 
Recuperatores (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13219/full) in 
private cases, and the juries in criminal panels. Following Greek tradition, the Roman manuals on 
rhetoric concerned themselves with evidence and persuasion. Modern literature on Roman law has 
almost completely neglected the topic. The best reference is Kaser and Hackl (1996: 117–20, 361–9,
491–2, 599–607), differentiating between the historical periods of Roman legal procedure; see also
Schulz (1951: 23–4).
Rome 
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Over the centuries the list of “non-artistic” proofs (in Aristotle's rhetorical sense) has been enlarged:
tabulae (documents), testimonia (witness depositions; see Testimonium
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13248/full)), pacta conventa
(contracts), quaestiones (questioning under torture; see Quaestio
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13215/full)), leges (laws; see Lex, 
leges (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13172/full)), senatus 
consulta (decrees of the Senate), res iudicatae (precedents), decreta (decrees of magistrates; see
Decretum (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13066/full)), and 
Responsa (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13223/full) (opinions 
of jurists), all mentioned in Cic. Orat. 2.116; praeiudicia (precedents), rumores (rumors), tormenta
(statements under torture), Iusiurandum
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13131/full) (oath), and testes
(witnesses), mentioned in Quint. Inst. or. 5.1.2. Again, laws and the means of proving facts are
mingled. From the second category of “proof” only witness depositions and – since courts and
procedure have changed – documentary evidence were of legal relevance. Precedents were not
binding, but rather had rhetorical impact; while opinions uttered on special cases by the small and
exclusive circle of jurists acting in Rome had the force of legal statutes. At least in the preparatory
stage in iure, before the Praetor
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah20109/full), the plaintiff had to 
disclose all means of evidence to the defendant (editio, Ulp. Dig. 2.13.1.3; Kaser and Hackl, 1996: 
220, 362).
To provide witness testimony was a duty of friendship and a privilege for free, respectable persons. 
Under sanction of infamy a witness called to observe certain formal acts was not allowed to refuse 
testimony about that act (XII T. 8.22). In criminal trials depositions drafted in writing were read aloud 
during the speeches. Witnesses had to swear oaths and after the first speeches were cross-examined 
by the parties, normally by their advocates, first the plaintiff's witnesses and then the defendant's, each 
only once. An absent witness could testify through a sealed document (Testatio
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13247/full)) confirmed in court by 
witnesses who had been called to the act of the deposition. For false evidence, capital punishment was 
originally imposed (XII T. 8.23), later only a fine and compensation to the party who had lost the 
case. Bribing a witness was punished as a crime.
Torture was applied to slave witnesses in, above all, criminal cases. Torture in private cases is 
mentioned only briefly in Pomponius Dig. 12.4.15 and Papinian Dig. 19.5.8, and in the second case 
the plaintiff himself had administered the questioning; cf. also Paulus Dig. 21.1.58.2. As witnesses, 
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Roman citizens were questioned under torture only in crimen maiestatis (crime against the state), a 
rule that from the time of Marcus Aurelius was generally extended to the lower classes (Humiliores
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah22157/full)); the “more
honorable” (Honestiores
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah22149/full)) were exempted (CJ
9.41.11). One must distinguish torture as a means of punishment from torture as a form of 
questioning. The former was imposed first in the provinces on non-citizens, in postclassical criminal 
law generally on humiliores.
Documents over time came to be of some importance in private cases. Since a case could stretch over 
several hearings, the single judge and the small Roman courts had enough time to examine 
documents' authenticity by inspecting the unbroken seals and by evaluating the witnesses of the 
documents. The judges were free to form their own opinions about the trustworthiness of private 
documents. By several means the praetor could also force an unwilling party to produce certain 
documents for the trial (edictum de edendo on formal contracts, stipulationes; interdictum de tabulis 
exhibendis on wills). Forgery was punished as a crime.
With the cognitio extra ordinem after Diocletian, the system of evidence essentially changed. The 
judge, now a state official, was master of the trial. Since he officially had to search for the truth it was 
no longer the responsibility of the parties, but his responsibility to question the witnesses and to 
determine which documents were to be produced. To find the facts the judge also questioned the 
parties. Binding rules on the probative force of documents and witnesses were enacted. Documents 
became superior to witness testimony. When issued by a professional scribe (tabellio; see Tabelliones
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13235/full)) they constituted 
decisive proof if not rebutted by special sidebar trials. This scribal form became mandatory for many 
contracts. Certain numbers of witnesses (up to five) were stipulated for concluding oral transactions 
and for proving them in court.
 
SEE ALSO: Crimen (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13061/full); 
Formula (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13103/full); Gesta
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13106/full); Instrumentum
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13121/full); Oaths, Greek and 
Roman (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13190/full); Twelve 
Tables (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13255/full).
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Until the edition by Selb and Kaufhold (2002), this source was seen as containing an “enigmatic”
mixture of Roman law and non-Roman law, i.e., local customs from the east of the Late Roman
Empire (Buckland 1963: 48; Maas 2000: 247–9, with some passages translated into English). Now,
scholarly opinion holds that this book collected and explained (for law school teaching in an Eastern
province) Constitutiones
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13055/full) (statutes) enacted by
Roman emperors of the fifth century; only some of the didactic explanations reflect local legal practice
and ideas. The – unpreserved – original version was written in Greek at the end of the fifth century.
After the Islamic conquest, Christians continued using the law book, but in a Syrian translation
written in the sixth century. The Syrian text was translated into Arabic and Armenian, and in the
eighteenth century the Armenian one into Georgian; in different versions all these texts are preserved
in manuscripts kept now by Orthodox or Uniate Churches of the Christian Orient.
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Selb and Kaufhold (2002) published the first critical edition of the Syrian version. In its first volume 
a survey is given of former scholarly research, as well as of the original number and sequence of 
paragraphs; they also provide lists of concordances of the differently enumerated paragraphs, and a 
Syrian-German glossary. The second volume contains the text, critical apparatus, and a translation 
into German. In the third volume the historical and legal aspects of each paragraph are commented on. 
(For the history of the edition see Kaufhold 2005.)
In a quite unsystematic way Roman official legislation on private, penal, and public law is collected 
and, on a very modest juristic level, explained: mainly inheritance; marriage and dowry; paternal 
authority; slaves; and the procedure connected with these issues. Much research is still to be done, for 
example, comparing the actual clauses known from contracts preserved in papyri with the fictitious 
didactic cases. For the influence of the law book on Islamic law see Crone (1987).
 
SEE ALSO: Law schools
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah13142/full).
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